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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

HERBERT B. MAW~ \\!Et\DHI .. L B~
HAMMOND and GEORGE K.
FADEL~

Plaintiffs and Respondentst
vs.

Case No+
9107

BRACK HOWARD NOHLf and ANN
C~ NOBLE~ his wife~

Defendants and Appellants.

BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS AND Al:ll1 ELLANrl'S

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The above entitled matter was tried, without a jury, on
the 25th day of May~ 1959. From a judgment in the sum of
$11~250 . 58 in favor of the plaintiffs, the defendants appeal.
This matter arose over the question of attorney fees .. In·. 195 5
the clefendants, as owners of land located on the Salt LakeDavis County lines, were named as patty defertdants . "iri

a

3
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condemnation suit by the State of lJ tah who sought to conL
demn their land for the use of a highway. The defendants
retained the services of Herbert B. Maw, one of the above

named plaintiffs, to repres.en t them in the litigation. Subse·
quently, at the defendants' request~ George Fadel and Wendell
B. Hammond were associated in the case . Shortly thereafter
an ~\Agreement for Employment of Attorneys'~ \\ as entered
7

into betw-een the above named parties+ A copy of the employ~

ment agreement is attached to this brief and marked Appendix

A.
After a protracted litigation, the Supreme Court of 0tah
affirmed a judgment in favor of. t..he de£ endants in the su~n

of $140,000.00+ On March 11, 1959, the State of Utah paid
over to the de f eodants all amounts due under the judgment
which had not been paid prior thereto~ the total amount being
$169, 5 21.07 ~ This sum represented ·the principal amount of
the judgment of $140 ~ 000.00, and accumulated interest dating
from the time of taking in 1955 in the sum of $29,521.07+

The state~ in making payment to the defendants, named the
plaintiffs as joint payees of the final settlement check. There-

after the pla1ntiffs submitted to the defendants a statement
of the division of the judgment paid by the State of Utah
(Ex hi bit No. 12) ~. Th c p1a.intiffs asserted _that the interest
amounting to $29,521.0~ was a parr of the recovery and therefore was to be pro rated out in accordance with the agreement

of employment, which in this case made one-half of the interest
payable to the attorneys as fees. The defendants contended

that the interest was to be di v i4ed~ pro· rata~ between the plain·
tiffs and the defendants~ based upon what each was entitled

to of the $I40JOOO.OO under the employment contract. The

4
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defendants rejected the accounting

of the

plaintiffs~ who

thereupon refused to surrender the check to the defendants

for the balance due from the State of Ctah. The plaintiffs
imm.ed iately commenced a suit, and upon stipulation between
counsel the check was cashed and $12)000.00 of said check was
deposited with the Clerk of Court pending the outcome of
the suit. The balance of the moneys received from the check

were paid to plaintiffs and defendants as. their interest appeared
under the agreement.
The plaintiffs in their com plaint aileg cd that $1,9 7 5. 00
co 11 ected by the defend a 0 ts some two years be£ ore as s ettl ew
ment of a condemnation suit in Davis County, Utah~ \vas

subject to the contract and there.fore they were entitled to
$9S 7. 50 of that amount. This assertion was not contained in
the accounting submitted by the attorneys before filing suit.
The defendants filed an answer to the plaintiffs' com plaint and
counterclaimed) alleging that the defendants \Vere entitled

to interest on certain sums advanced the plaintiffs as advance
attorney fees.
The plaintiffs maintained at the trial that the interest
.accumulated since the taking of the property above referred
to including the interest on the $80,000.00

hich was exempt
under the tertns o £ the contract) 'vas a part of the j ud gm en t)
J

\V

and therefore divisible under the agreement by and between
the parties herein.
On the other hand, tbe defendants con tended that the
interest accumulated on the $80~000.00 exempt under the terms
of the agreement was not a part of the judgment~ ~nd there-:.
fore plain tiffs could not and shou 1d not partici pat~ and di yide;·
5
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that interest+

r urther, the

de fen d.ants asserted and contended that the

interest over and above that on the $80~000 .00 should be
divided

by and behveen the parties herein upon toe basis of

the ptopo rtion of the principal, to-wit. $140 ~ 000 00, to which
each was entitled.
+

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT ONE
A contract of employment between a.n attorney and a
eli en t~ if there is ambiguity, must as a matter of law be construed against the attorney and for the client.

POINT TWO
Interest awarded in a condemnation suit under U tab law is
a v.,rarded as a matter of right and not as a matter of judicial
discretion.

POINT THREE
A contingent fee contract which excludes $80,000.00 from

the computation of attorney fees} likewise, as a matter of
excludes the accrued interest upon that amount.

law~

POINT FOUR
A contingent fee contract for attorneys fee5 which is based
upon obtaining compensation for land being condemned does
not include as part of the recovery the interest paid as

dent to the

an inci-

recovery~

POINT FIVE
De£ endants are entitled to interest on all sums advanced

6
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plaintiffs from the time of the advance until time \Vhen plain~
tiffs were entitled to attorney fees.
ARGUMENT

POINT 01\E
A CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT BETWEEN AN
ATTORNEY AND A CLIENT, If THERE IS AMBIGUil'Y~
MUST AS A MATTER OF LAW BE CONSTRUED
AGAINST THE ATTORNEY AND fOR THE CLIENT.
The annotator 1vriting in 2 ALR 844 sets forth the general
law of the American courts in the opening paragraph of his
work in stating:
nit is a general la\\' that? on account of the confidential relation betvieen them, contracts made betw-een
an attorney and a eli en t, a£ ter the tela tio n has been
established, are to be construed against the attorney.
It is undisputed that this contract \Vas entered into some
months after the employment of the p laintHI attorneys by the
defendants to protect their interests and defend them in the
suit filed by the State of Utah condemning their land. (R~ 23,
R. 29, Exhibit 1-D, Exhibit 2-P) State of Utah v. Noble,
H

---- U

I

r~~~

P2d ----

p

The ambiguity which is contained within this contract
is \vhether or not interest should become a part of the !Lamount
recovered':> and be_ divided as set fa rth in the contract, or
\\' hether or not the interest should be divided pro rata between
the parties based upon -~vhat each party is entitled to based upon
the principal amount recovered~ which \Vas $140, 000.00~
The California courts in speaking on the subject of
attorney rei i ent con tracts where there is an ambiguity as to the
7
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intent of the parti cs, stated in the case of Pin to v. See1y, 2 2

CaL App.

318~

135 P. 43:

''It may be conceded that in construing contracts
behveen attorneys and clients concerning compensa·
tion~ in ~. hich there is any ambiguity as to the intent
of the parties, it is the rule., generally accepted by the
courts, to adopt such a construction of· the contract as
will be most favorable to the interests of the client."
The £ederal courts in addition to the state courts have
adopted the rule that where doubtful or ambiguous language in

an agreement for fees h.as been used the agreement nlust be
construed most favorably to the client~ Waugh et aL v. Q & C
Co~

et al., CCA 7th, ( 1926) 16 F.2d 363 . Other authorities
citing the general rule are: 5 Am Jur 356~ Attorneys at Law,
Sect. 159; 7 CJS 1055, Attorney and Client, Sect. 182; Re~
statement of Lav.r\ Contractsl Sec. 236l p. 330.

Based upon the above d ted authorities~ the contract noVt)"
before this court~ must, as a matter of law~ be construed in
the light most favorable to the Nobles and against the interests
of the attorneys.

A duty devolved upon the attorneys to affirmatively define
what was meant by the terms ''any amount recovered~' and
nall amounts recoveredn in the contract of employment itsel£7
Their failure to do so must be construed against them, and
there£ ore the inclusion of interes t in to ~~all amounts recovered,·
is erroneous and the district court in ruling that the interest
should be included was in error.
POINT TWO
INTEREST AWARDED IN A

CONDEMNATION

8
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SUIT UNDER G1'AH LAW IS AWARDED AS A MATTER
OF RIGHT AND NOT AS A MATTER OF JUDICIAL
DISCRETION.
Interest has been defined as;
t'lnterest is compensation for the use or forbearance

of

money.~t

30 Am Jur 7, Interest, Sect. 2

The Utah courts recognize that interest is compensation
for the use of money or prope.rty and have so held. The
Supreme Court in ruling on the matter stated:

HI£ he had loaned the money to someone, he certainly
would be entitled to interest, and if he borrowed it
from someone:t he Vi.rould Jikcl y have to pay interest for
its use. By being awarded legal interest, therefore) he
is simply placed in status quo~ a.nd nothing short of
thi.s is full compensation, and that is just what the law
aims to

accomplish+·~

Fell v. Union Pacific Ry. Co.
32 U. 101:- 88 P. 1003, 1005

This case was cited w lth approval in the condemnation
suit of San Pedro, L.A. & S.L. Ry. Co. v+ Board of Education
of Salt Lake City) 35 U. 13, 99 Pr 263, 267. This court has
ruled that in a condemnation suit, interest rna y be given only
.at 6 per cent, the statutory legal rate~ under 15-1·1~ Utah Code
Annotated, 19 53) which provides:
~·Leg~l

Rate.-The legal rate of interest for the loan
or forbearance of any money] goods or things in action
shall be sjx per cent per ann urn.
tt

This was set forth in the Utah case of State v+ Danielsen,
122 L 220~ 247 P.2d 900. The basis upon which the court
has ruled that the 6 per cent is applicable is that until final
1

•

9
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determination there i 5 no judgment, and as there is a

4
4:

£or

w

bearance" the statutory amount must apply.
The interest which is av./arded in condemnation suits in
the State of Utah is not a \V arded as a judicial act as s. uch~ but

is awarded by the mandate of the legislature, which passed
legislation v.rhich makes jt mandatory to pay interest where
there is a 4. forbearance'~ of money+ This principle has been
recognized by this court in many cases. State v. Daniel sen~
122 U. 220~ 247 P.2d 900; State v. Peek, 1 U.2d 263, 265
P.2d 630.
In the leading Illinois. case of Blakeslee's Storage \\l arehouse v+ Chicago, 369 IlL 480~ 17 ~E 2d 1, 120 ALR 715~ the
court declared:
4

~'In

determining whether interest on a judgment is
a part of itl the character of a judgment and the
authority for imposing interest are important factors
to be considered. A judgment is the sentence of the Jaw
pronounced by the court upon the rna tter contained in
the record. 3 Blackstone~s Com. 395~ It is the law'.s
last 'vord in a judicial controversy and may be defined
as the :final consideration and determination of a court
upon matters submitted to it in an action or proceeding. 15 RCL~ Judgments, 569. A judgment is the
judicti,tl act of the court Dorman v. Usbe Building and
Loan Assn~ 115 NJL 337, 180 A. 413. On the other
hand the right to in teres t a part from con tract~ such a.s
inter est on a judgm cnt, does not emanate from the con·
troversy, or from the judgment, or from anything of

a judicial natwe. ·~
In a later Ill ina is case of Ch apal.i s v ~ Gty of Chicago~
38 9 Ill+ 269, 59 N ~E. 2d 641, the Supr erne Court affirmed the
Blakeslee's case and said:

ttin the latter case ( Blakesleets) it was said,
10
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~If

appellant is entitled to interest on the judgment it is
not by virtue of the judgment or the judicial proceed~
ing culminating therein) but arises solei y under the
provisions of the statute~''
Interest, then~ a\varded a.s a matter of right cannot be
said to be a part of the "amount recovered" due to a judgment.
attaches~

by operation of la \V) to the amount
recovered. Therefore the right to a p.art of that interest depends
upon the right to a part of the principal and the proportion
of the principal claimed determines the proportion of the
interest which goes w.i th that principal.

The interest

POINT THREE
A CONTINGENT FEE CONTRACT WHICH

CLUDES

EX~

$80~000.00

FROM THE COMPUTATION OF
ATTORNEY FEES, LIKEWISE, AS A MATTER OF LAW,

EXCLUDES THE ACCRUED INTEREST UPON THAT
AMOUNT.
An examination of· the contract under review (Appendix
A of this brief) shows that it was the agreement bet?leen the
parties that $8 0, 0 00.00 would be ex:cl uded from the con tt a.ct

under which the plaintiffs were to receive their compensation
for legal services. Plaintiffs contend that the interest earned
by this $80 t 000.00 would be subject to their proportional atto rneys' fees. The de£ en dan ts contend that as the $80~000. 00 was
excluded from the contract, so then~ is the interest upon that
amount~

As pointed out in Point

T\\'O

of this brief, interest is

awarded in condemnation suits as a matter of right and the
court could not withhold the a war~. of interest. Therefore,
11
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the employment of legal co uns e1 to .secure this interest "\Vas
not only unn eccssary but 'vas not contracted for by the parties
involved.
The intent of this contract~ and the Jegal proposition that
the contract. must be construed in favor of the client~ clearly
sho"~s that the parties exd ud ed from this

that which

~Tas

ein ploy men t contract

already vested, that is, the $80,000.00~ (Exhibit

t- D ~ R- 40) The right to interest had like"~ ise vested on this
r

$80,000.00 prior to the employment of the attorneys under

the con tract, and 1i tiga tion 'vas unnecessary to recover it; th erew
fore it cannot be said that the interest was con ternplated by
either party to be a part of nany amount recovered'~ or "~of
amoun t.s recovered.'' The reason for the exclusion of the
$80,00 0.00 from the contract was that the K o hies could collect
this amount without the necessity of litigation, likewise the
interest upon this amount from the time of the taking under
the Order of Immediate Occupancy until paid. The intent
is clear and the legal inference in fa:vor of the client .shows
that the interest on the $80,000.00 \Vas not to be taken into
account under the con tract
A similar case to the one now under review by this court
arose in Tennessee in Sanders v ~ Riddich~ 12 7 Ten o. 700~ 15 6
S.W. 464. In that case the attorney and client entered into a

contingent £ee contract which provided for attorney's fees
of one-third of any recovery if under $12,000.00 and one-fourth
if over $1 2 000.00. Judgment \vas recovered in the amount of
$11, 500.0 0, but with accrued interest the total amount collected
j

The plaintiff in this action, the
eli en t, contended that the attorney v..ras en titled to one- fourth
amolinted to $12,788.00.

12
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only, as the amount recovered was in excess of $12,000.00+ The
Supreme Court of Tennessee rejected the claim of the eli en t

and in ruling in favor of the attorney

said~

"That recovery was for less than $12~000.00 and the
rights of the attorneys attached thereto on a 1/3 basis.
T l1 e interest accrued~ in le gat con tern p Ja tion, on the
respective aliquot parts/'

The Arizona Supreme Court 1n dealing with a similar
situation involving a contingent fee contract said in the case
of Covert v. Randles~ 53 Ariz. 22 5~ 8 7 P ~2d 488:

tiWe think the correct rule for construing contracts
for contingent fees is well stated in 7 Corpus Juris
Secundum, .Attorney and Client, p. ·1 089] Sec. 191~ as
follows:
'A con tin gent fee is general Iy reckoned on the net
amount actually recovered by the client through the
e£f o rts of the attorney~ or through a pro per settlement by the client.~
'Under a contract for a contingent fee, the petrentage to ~rhich the attorney is entitled and the
amount or property on which it is to be based depend on a fair and reasonable construction of the
terms of the agreement; and such £ee general i y is
recoverable only on the property or funds, within
the terms of the contract, which are recovered by
reason of the attorney's efforts~ and~ therefore, is
not recoverable on uncontested claims or sums voluntarily paid.~ ~t
Under the definition as adopted by the Arizona court~
where the attorney does nothing to earn the fee he is not entitled to any part of that amount ·~vhich is recovered. In the
present case, the in teres t which is awarded by the State of
Utah .as a _matter of right stands as a payment ~n an uncon&

13
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tested claim or which is a voluntary pa ym en t by the people
of the State of Utah to · a citizen who has had his property
taken £or the public good, but 'v ho has been de] a ycd i I 1 the

receiving of the money.

The State of Nev.·· York has settled the matter of the
interpretation of a contingent fee contract in condemnation
cases where there is cliff icu lty in the division of the interest
between attorney and client. This matter has been litigated
repeatedly and the. Supreme. Court of New York relies upon
its decision in Bassford v. Johnson~ 172 N.Y. 488~ 65 N.E.
260, in rendering its opinions. In that case certain land was

being taken by condemnation. The landowner retained an
attorney on a contingent fee contract which provided that the
a~mey was to· collect as his fee nlO% of whatever award
may be obtained for my (Johnson~s) land~'~ A judgment was
obtained and interest allowed by the court on the judgment,

which interest was in excess of $13,000.00. The defendant,
Johnson, the 1an downer, contended that the attorney was
entitled only to 10% of the judgment and none of the interest.
The Supreme Court of New York ruled that the attorney was
entitled to his proportion a 1 share of the interest. The court
said~
4

~By

its terms the attorney \\·as to receive for his
services 10% of 'vhatever a\vatd may be obtained for
Johnson's 1and. The ti tie to the land was taken~ as we
have seenj by the city on the 1st day of July~ 1897, and,
i£ the award had been then made., the attorney, unw
questionably would have been entitled to 10 per cent
the reo£ and the i nte rest thereon that thereafter ace rued
do\vn to the date of the payment; but the award \vas
not tnad e until nearly four years thereafter+ But when

14
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made, it was for the value of the land at the time that
the title \vas taken by the city~ and therefore) so far as
interest is concerned, the a \v a rd is deemed to have been
made of that date, so that the effect is the same as
if the award had been made on that day and payment
postponed for four years thereafter.
11

It is submitted that this is exact! y the sarne si tua tio n in the
case now before the court~ The a\vard of $140~000.00 made
by this courtt State v. Noblet ____ U. ____ , ~~~- P.Zd -~--~relates back to
19 55 when the land in 9uestion was taken~ The recovery in
this case then ~·as the amount of the award of the court. The
accrued interest v.,roul d attach to the respective pro rata parts
of this recovery, which ~Tas divided between the attorney
and client urider the employment agreement. The interest,
therefore, on the excluded amount of $80,000.00 \Vas not a
part of the ~~amount recovered.''

A case whe1ein a similar problem of dividing interest
arose in Smith v. \X'hitma.n~ 159

rvid.

478~ 150

A. 856. This
case involved the taking of land by condemnation by the
federal government during World War I. At the time of the
taking in 191 7 the government offered the Jan downers
$3,000.00, which was unacceptable to them. The landowners,
de£ en dan ts~ retained the plaintiffs to .fi.ght the case £or them.
They entered in to a con tin gent fee con tract \V herein the attorneys 'VIt'ere to get one-third of all amounts recovered in excess
of $3~000.00. At the time of the making of the contract between
the attorneys and clients, the federal government did not pay
interest on land taken by condemnation for actions prosecuted
through the federal court of claims. However, in 192 3~ during
the pendency of the action) the Supreme Court of the L"!nited
States, in a decision, ruled that interest would be paid from
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the time of the taking of the 1and until entry of judgment.
The attorneys for 10 years pursued the case until eventually
they received a judgment for $106~072.29, which included
interest, principal and court costs. In computing the attorney
fees the following method was used: The first $3)000.00 was

excluded as provided in the contract of employment, then the
interest which had accrued on this $ 3~ 000 00 1ikewis e \. . as
excluded. This in tcre.) t a. mounted to $3) 5 13.7 5. The attorneys
then computed their fee upon the one-third basis as set forth
in the contract. This method of computation \vas adopted by
+

the trial court as correct. The Supreme Court of Maryland
<.:oncurred with the computation method~ but reversed on the
grounds that even though there was no dispute as to the
method employed~ it \vas a jury~s prerogative to decide this
matter and not the courts.
The defendants in the case now before this court contend

that the same method of computation with regard to the
.$80,000.00 excluded frotn the contract should be employed
as was done in the Smith v. Whitman case. In the present case
the interest upon the $80,000.00 amounts to the sum of
$13,865.35 (Exhibit No. 10) which, \vhen added to the
$80,000.0 0, makes a total exclusion from attorneys fees of
the swn of $93,865+3 5.
Under the contention of the plaintiffs (attorneys), this
entire amount of $13,865.35 is subject to the contingent fee
seale~ Vot' hich pI aces the entire amount in the bracket of 50 r; r
attorney fees or, in other words~ the interest on the $80) 0 00.00
exc Iuded under the terms of the con tract is divided one- half to
the attorneys and one-half to the clients) or $6,9 32.67 to the
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attorneys as fees upon an amount excluded from the contract
of employment.

It may be ·readi 1y seen that it would be to the advantage
of attorneys to ex tend as long as possible the adjudication of
matters such as this \vhere such a contract of employment exists.
Such a division of this interest is not only unconscionable
but was not the intention of the parties at the t i£9-e of t h c
making of the contract It is inconceivable that anyone would
exclude $80~ 000~ 00, the amount that they had already been
offered, and would offer to share the interest which ·~vould
accrue upon this amount and which would be payable without

the necessity of 1i tigation or representation of an attorney.
As nothing was required on the part of the attorney~ to
obtain this interest) they are not entitled to any part of it. As
stated in the Covert v. Randles case cited above:
!tlf the contingent fee agreed upon ¥t'ete out of propor~
tion to the services to be rendered, it would be the duty
of the court to deny recovery on that account. ~t
Covert v. Randles
53 Ariz. 225, 87 P.2d 488
The tria] court erred in allowing the plaintiffs one-half

of the accrued interest on the exempted $80,000.00, and this
ruljng must as a rna tter of Ia w
reversed and the amount of

be

1nterest allowed by the trial court to the plaintiffs be returned

to the defendants~
POINT FOUR
A CONTINGENT FEE CONTRACT FOR ATTORL\~EYS
FEES WHICH IS BASED UPON OBTAINING COMPENSATION FOR LAND BEING CONDEIVI!\1ED DOES NOT

17
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INCLUDE AS PART OF THE RECOVERY THE INTEREST
PAID AS AN INCIDENT. TO THE RECOVERY.
The plaintiffs) attorneys, were retained by the defendants
to represent them in the iitiga tion with the State of Utah to
determine the value of the land being condemned. The exact
scope of the plain tiffs' ern ployment is set forth in the e1nployment agreement in plaintiffs· own words (Exhibit 1- D) :
~ ~ 3_ Attorney 5 agree to represent CJ ien t in a goodl
diligent and professional manner in obtaining compen·
sation for Client from the State of Utah for land being

condemned. ''
As stated heretofore~ inter est is awarded in the State of
Utah in condemnation matters as a matter of right, and there£ore it is unnecessary for anyone, including the defendants
in this action, to retain attorneys to enforce his right to interest
on a\vards in eminent domain cases. This fact was \vell known
to the attorneys at the time of the making of this contract.
Therefore, as the question of interest was not under dispute
with the State of ·utah, the attorneys were not representing
the ~·Client, defendants) in obtaining interest as a part of
the compensation for the taking of the land.
t

As seen

j

heretofore~

the Supreme Court awarded the sum
of $140~000.00 as compensation to the Nobles for the taking
of their land. The interest was awarded under the mandate
of the Legis laturel which provides that interest will be awarded
v-.-~here there has been a forbearance of money. The attorneys
themselves stipulated that their services were to the obtaining
of compensation for the Jand, and the schedule of fees tQ
be charged was for that service~
The headnotes of a series of condemnation cases decided
18
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in 1941 in Illinois, entitled People ex rel v. Kelly, Mayor et al,

32 N.E. 2nd 920, 921 (Case No. 1 and 2) 922, 923, states:
4

The interest on a condemnation judgment cannot
be con side red pa r:t of the value of the land taken~ and
right to interest is not by virtue of judgment or the
judicial proceedings cu Imina tin g thcr ein but so1ely under statute.''
t

There£ ore~ the entire in tere5 t which had accrued under the
award of $140,000.00 was excluded from the contract~ but

accrued as to the aliquot parts that the attorneys and the
defendants were entitled to after the division of the $140,000.00
under the terms of the contract.
The case5 cited in Point Three of this brief are all a pp licable as to the proposition of law that the entire amount of

interest should be excluded from the contract as the interest
does not constitute a part of the amount recovered j' under the
tt

contract under review.
The schedule of attorneys' fees is based upon '"services
to be rendered in this rna tter ~ ~ (Exhibit 1 D, Paragraph 2) .
w

No services were expended for the collection of interest.

In the Cali for ni a case of Ho llings"W~o r th v.

Le~v is,

9 3 Cal.
App. 526~ 269 P. 709, the Court examined a contingent fee
contract "i;Vhich provided for ''50% of refunds~~ as compensation
for the attorney~ s services. The court stated:
·~As

the contract \jjtas tnade between an attorney and
his client, the ambiguity should be resolved against the
attorney and in favor of the client.~'
1~he

ambiguity of ~hich the court speaks is w~ether or
not. int~rest ~warded on the refunds made is.~. part of the

19
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

t~ refund.'·

The court ruled that under the tenus of the contract
the attorneys \vere t~ receive as compensation 50~X:· of the
~refunds' and not of all sums collected, and there£ ore the
interest vJtas excluded f rorn the contract as interest is not a
t

t

refund.

T'his i.s the sa me situation as in the instant case. Here,
the attorneys contracted to use their bcs t efforts in securing
compensation for. the taking of the Jand. This could only mean
the value of the land at the time of the taking. Bassford vs.
Johnson, cited in Point Three.

The plaintiffs insist that the words

~~amounts

recoveredn

and "any amount recovered" mean both principal and interest.
r;nder their theory} costs awarded

by the court likewise should

be inc Iuded as part of the recovery to

\V hich

entitled~ even though the defendants have

the attorneys are

borne all the costs

themselves. It is obvious that this is not the law.

It is submitted that the entire contract must be read and
interpreted in light of the meaning of the entire documentl
and not upon a single phrase of that contract.
~~An

agr ecm en t should be interpreted as a whole
and the meaning gathered from the entire context! and
not from part icu 1a r "\VO rds :t phrases or clauses. In fact~
the en tire agreement is to be considered to determine
the meaning of each part.'·
12 Am. Jur. 772, Contracts, Sec. 241

The Utah Supreme Court~ in the case of Vitagraph Inc. v+
American Theatre Co., 77 U. 71~ 291 P. 303, 306~ stated:
~~In

construing a contractl however) -=the interpretation must be upon the entire instrument and not merely
on disjointed or particular parts of it. The whole con·
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text js to be considered in ascertaining the intention
of the parties, even though the immediate object of
inCJUiry is the meaning of a.n isolated clause.~ n
It is co needed that the words used ln the agreement must

be examined to see what their meaning isj and therefore \Ve
wish to cite additional authority as to the meaning of the 'vords
Hamount reco¥ered." The meaning must, however~ be applied
to the intent of the entire con tract.
The Supreme Court of Nev..,· Mexico~ in the case of Cand el.aria v. Cutie.rrez~ 28 N Jvl. 4 34, 213 P. 103 7, ruled that the meaning of the phrase, ~·amount of judgment~~~ means the tiamount
for which a recovery Is to be had~ without reference vlhatever to
the accumulations attaching thereto by \Vay of interest and
costs."' This case centered· around the interpretation of a

statute of New Mexico ~Thich req uircd the posting of a super ..
sedeas bond for the ~ ~ a.moun t of the judgment.''
The Supreme Court of Florida, in the case of Atlantic

Coastline R. Co. v.

Coadunan~

52 So. 33 7, 59 Fla. 130, rendered an interpretation of the meaning of the ph rase ·~amount
recovered.'~ In that case, the court· said:
''We think the amount recovered means the amonnt
of cIaim recovered, and not that amount plus the 5o%
interest. The amount of claim recovered is made the
basis of the 507o interest and the attorney fees allowed
by the statute. *
The amount of recovery relates
to the disputed amount of the claim; and 507o not
being recovered in this sense but allo\v ed by th c
statute.t'

**

As stated before~ in Ctah the disputed claim is as to the
value of the property at the time of the taking by the party
condemning it. Therefore, interest V\o'hich is a~v·arded for_ the
21
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time of the forbearance of the payment of this sum is not
included in the ··amount of recovery+" I'he Utah courts have

defined

in the law of em in en t domain as a

r. compensation''

recompense in value~ a quid pro quo~ and stated that it must

be paid io money. Oregon Short Line R. Co. v. Fox, 28 l~.
311) 78 P.. soo.

Under th c ruling of the T enncssee case of Sanders v.
Riddich ~ cited in Point Three, v..rhich cited \Vi th approval tb e
N e\v Y ark case of Bassford v. Johnson, likewise cited in Point
l"hree, the entire amount of interest ··accrued in legal contemplation, on the respective aliquot parts" of tbe judgment+
That is to say, the attorneys were entitled to the interest that
their proportional share of the $140~000.00 earned during
the period of forbearance) and the Nobles were entitled to the
inter est that their pro portion a [ share of the $140,000.00 earned
during the same period.

POINT FJVE
DEFENDANTS ARE ENTITLED 1~0 INTEREST ON
ALL SUlviS ADVANCED PLAINTIFFS FROM 1~HE TI~lE
OF THE ADVANCE LT~TIL TIME \X'HE2\ PLAINTIFFS
WERE ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES.
1

The record sho,vs) and it is not disputed, that the de-fendants advanced the plaintiffs sums of money which were
retained by the a ttorncys as advanced attorney fees.

These

sums are $360.00 paid )uJy 5~ 1956) and $3~500.00 paid June

5, 1958 (Exhibit No. 11).

Defendants filed a counterclaim against the plaintiff sl and
alleged the payment of the .$3)500.00, and the plaintiffs tn
22
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replying to the counterclaim admitted receiving the money.
The trial court erred in refusing to award defendants
interest upon the sums so paid the plaintiffs. Defendants are
entitled to this interest as at the time of the payment of the
$360.00 no judgment had been rendered in the condemnation
suit~

and this constitu ed a payment of attorneys fees

\V hich

were contingent upon there being a recovery in excess of
$80,000.00~

Likewise, the $3j 500.00 was paid prior to the

confirmation of the judgment by the Supreme Court and vras

paid out of the $72 ,000~ 00 paid by the State to the Nobles
in June~ 1958. As the entire $72,000.00 belonged to tbc Nobles
free of any attorneys fees, an advance to the attorneys constituted merely a loan to them on which the Nobles are en-

titled to interest. As shown under Exh !hit 8, th c interest u pan
this $3t500.00 amounted to $16lr00.
The court failed to make any £i ndings of fact or conclusions of Iaw with regard to the clef endants' counterclaim~
wherein the interest upon this $3~500.00 Vlas claimedt or any
:findings of fact or conclusions of law \vith regard to the
claimed offset of the interest upon the $360+00 from 1956
unti i 19 59 on the claimed a. ttor n ey fees. This cons ti tu tcs error
and the defendants are en tit led to a new trial to determine the
matter of their counterclaim.

The defendants in their proposed fin dings of Fact and
j

Conclusions of Law, set £orth this co un tercla.im and off set,
but the court refused to sign them+
3 Am. Jur. 660, Appeal and Error> Sec. 1147t states:
~~The f ai 1ure or refusal of the trial court to make
.findings of facts rna ter ial to the decision is ground for
rever5al on appeal by a party prejudiced thereby * * * ,.
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It is obvious that the ignoring of defendants' co un tercl aim

by .the court in making its findings and conclusions has prejudiced the defendants and they have suffered materia 11y.
Rule 52 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure declares:
·~

Fjndlngs by the Court_ (a) Effect. In all actions
tried upon the facts ~·ithout a jury or with an advisory
jury:~ the court shaiJ] unless the same are waived, find
t h c facts spcc:ia ll y and state sepa ra tel y its conclusions
of la'v thereon and d.irect the entry of the appropriate
judgtnent.~~

The court did not adhere to this rule and therefore it
comJni tted revers i bJ e error, and the de£ endants arc entitled
to a new trial to determine their counterclaim and off set to the'
claimed attorneys' fees.

CONCLUSION
It is respect fu 1Jy subm i ttcd that th~ court erred in awarding
plaintiffs judgment in the amount of $11,250.58~ and~ furthet)
the court erred in not granting a judgment in favor of thc-

defendants and against plaintiffs in the amount of $227+ 1);.
as interest on the amount advanced to the plaintiffs by the
defendants out of their a-vw~n funds+
If the pJ ain tiffs are en titled to anything, they are en"
titled on1y to judgment in tbe amount of $1,125.03~ less. the
amount of $227.15 accutnulated as interest in favor of de-

fendants and against p1ain tiffs+
The court further erred in not making a .finding of fact
or conclusion of lavl relating to the in teres t claimed by the

defendants on the an1ount advanced to plaintiffs as hereinabove
mentioned~ and therefore it is respectfully submitt.ed that the
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court made a reversible error and defendants are entitled to a

new trial as more pa rticula.r1y set forth under Point Five of
this brief.
Res pectfu 11 y ~ u bmi tted,

COTRO-MANES & COTRO-MANES
Attorneys for Defendants and Appellants
APPENDIX A
AGREE~lENT

FOR

EMPLOY~lENT

OF A l'TORNEYS

BRACK H. NOBLE and ANN C. NOBLE, his v..rife~
hereinafter called the Client, hereby agree 'vith HERBERT
B+ MAW~ WENDELL B. HAMMOND~ & GEORGE K.
FADEL, attorneys at la V{ ~ here ina£ ter called Attorneys} as

follows:
hereby engages, designates and appoints Attarneys to represent Client in the pending condenmation proceedings by State of utah against Oient, involving about nine
acres of land of Clienfs located East of l; _ S. 91 and along
the Davis-Salt Lake County boundaries.
l. Client

2. Oient agrees to

pay said Attorneys for services to be

rendered in this n1a tter as fo I lows:

(a) 15% of amounts recovered over $80:t000.00 up

to

$90,000.00.

(b) 257'0 of amounts recovered over

$90~000.00 up to

$110JOOO.OO.
(c) 30% of atnounts recovered over $110,000.00 up to
$120,000.00.
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(d) 50% of any amount recovered over $120,000.00.
3~

Attorneys agree to represent Client in a good~ diligent
and professional manner in obtaining compensation for Client
from the State of Utah for the land being condemned.
WITNESS the hands of the parties this 12th day of

January1 1956.

/s/ B.

H~

Noble

/s/' Ann C. Noble

CLIENT

lsi Herbert B. Maw
Is! Wendell B. Hammond
/s/. . George K. Fadel

ATTORNEYS
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